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RIGHTS OF VENDOR AND VENDEE IN RESPECT OF

DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE.

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF,

GEORGE RICHARDS, ES9.,
Assisted by
GEORGE WHARTON PEPPER,

LUTHER R. HEWTT.

PEOPLE'S STREET RAILWAY CO.X. SPENCER.'

Insurance Money. Lessee with option to purchase.
Plaintiff conveyed land to defendant by deed, .and,received $2o,ooo, the
consideration money mentioned .therein. By a lease of the same date,
defendant leased the premises to plaintiff for one year at a nominal rent,
and in the lease gave an absolute and exclusive option to the plaintiff to
purchase the land at the end of the year for $io,ooo and interest. At the
end of the term, the arrangement was extended for another year. Plaintiff insured the buildings on the property for defendant's protection, the
policy to be "payable to him as. his interest may appear." Before the
expiration of the second year the buildings were burned. After the fire,
the plaintiff exercised the 6ption received from the defendant, and paid
him $2oooo. Defendalit claimed insurance money. Held, that on the
exercise of the option to redeem, plaintiff's equitable title reverted back
to the date of the original agreement, and plaintiff became the owner of
the land as it was at such date, or of the insurance money which stood
pro tanto in its place.

Opinion by MITCHELL, J.
THn RIGHTS OF VENDOR AND VENDEE IN RESPECT OF A POLICY OF
INSURANCE UPON PROPERTY SOLD.

Among recent decisions in the
domain of insurance law none has
raised more important questions or
furnished a basis for more interesting speculations than the decision
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Peoples' Street Railway
Co. v. Spencer (27 Atl. Rep. 113;
156 Pa. 85; July i9, 1893). Both
upon principle and authority, there
seems to be no doubt that the deciIReported in 156 Pa. 85.

sion of th6 Court is correct, .and
Mr. Justice MITCHELL, in a clear
and terse opinion, bases this decision upon intelligible grounds. It
seems to the writer, -however, that
the court might with advantage
have taken the opportunity to reduce the problem before them to
its simplest form and to solve it
with reference to two fundamental
principles of the law .of fire insur-

A POLICY OF INSURANCE UPON PROPERTY SOLD.

ance; one, that insurance is a personal contract and does not run with
the land ; the other,that the controlling feature of fire insurance is that
it is a contract of indemnity. If
this course had been adopted, it is
conceived that the case before the
court would have been seen to bear
an interesting relation to the leading English cases of Rayner v.
Preston (L. R. 18 Ch. D. 1, x881)
and Castelain v. Preston (L. R. II

Q. B. D. 380, 1883), as well as to
certain earlier cases decided by the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
especially Reed v. Lukens, 44 Pa.

(1863).
The case of the Peoples' Street
Railway Co. v. Spencer was an
action brought by the corporation
against Spencer 'to determine the
rights of the parties to certain
money deposited by a fire insurance
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company in payment of a loss by

fire. It appeared that the company
had been the owners of the property in question, and that in con
sideration of a payment of $2oooo

by Spencer a conveyance of the
property was executed to him
and a lease back to the company at a nominal rent with no
change of possession, which remained all the while in the company. This arrangement included
the giving by Spencer to the company of an absolute and exclusive

option to re-purchase at the end of
the year for the same sum with interest. At the end of the year the
company paid up the interest, and
the arrangement was renewed for
another year. During the continuance of the agreement the company effected an insurance upon
the premises and paid the premium. In the policy the company
were described as the assured, and
there was inserted therein the fol-

lowing clause: "The interest of
the assured in the above described
building is the right to purchase
from A. D. Spencer, owner; and,
in case of loss, the insurance is
payable to him, as his interest may
appear under said contract." The
property was destroyed by fire, and
pending this action (which was instituted as the result of an agreement between the company and
Spencer) the company exercised
the option to purchase and took a
conveyance upon payment of the
purchase money.
After stating the facts the opinion
of Mr. Justice MITcHELI proceeds, as follows:
"It is unimportant what name
we apply to the relation of the
parties during the year. Whether
technically vendor and vendee,
mortgagor and mortgagee, or lessor and lessee, is immaterial. The
nature of the relation is incontestable. Appellant was the holder of
the legal title, subject to an equity
in the company. It is strongly
argued for appellant that his interest at the time of the fire was an
absolute fee-simple title. But this
is an error. It was not absolute.
It was the legal title in fee, but
subject to the equitable interest of
the company, an interest in the
land, capable of being specifically
enforced,and good, not only against
the appellant, but all others, creditors, purchasers or strangers, to
whom the recorded deeds and the
company's possession gave notice.
The only substantial question in
the case is the date at which the
company's equity became complete.
The fire took place during the running of the term. The option to
redeem was exercised after the fire
had occurred. Did the company's
interest begin to run only from the
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exercise of its option, or did it,
upon that event, relate back for
all purposes to the transaction? We
are of opinion that both principle
and authority sustain the latter
view. As already said, the transaction was in substance a loan of
money, and appellant's right was
to have his money back with interest at a specified time, or, in default of that, to have his title become absolute. The insurance was
for his protection, not to increase
his profit; to keep up the sufficiency of his security while the loan
lasted, or make good the value of
his purchase, if it became absolute.
For that reason it was to be kept
up by the appellee. If the latter
had exercised its.option before the
fire, there could have been no
question that the insurance money
would have belonged to it. But
the date of the fire makes no substantial difference .when, as was the
case, the appellee elected to repay
the loan, and resumed its title. On
the happening of that contingency,
the appellant got his money, with
interest, which was all he -was entitled to; while the appellee got
badk its land, lessened in value by
the fire, but the loss compensated
by the insurance money. The insurance was, in contemplation of
law, for the benefit of whomever
should be entitled when the option
was exercised or expired by default, and, in fact, it was contracted
for "as interest may appear." It
stood in place of so much of the
property as was destroyed by the
.fire, and followed the title when
the equitable and legal interests
united. The authorities, so far as
we have any analogous case, lead
It was
to the game conclusion.
held in Kerr v. Day, 14 Pa. 112,
that an option to purchase is a sub-

stantial interest in land, which may
be conveyed to a vendee; and the
English chancery cases were reviewed by BELL, J., with the result that, "when the lessee made
his option to purchase, he, was to
to be considered as the owner ab
initio. Indeed, the determination
can only be supported by attributing to the lessee an equivalent
estate in the land, under his covenant fo an optional purchase,
which passed to his alienee, vesting him with the right to call for a
specific execution on declaring his
'election." And in Frick's Appeal,
ioi Pa. 485, where the land
was sold upon a prior judgment
before payment or conveyance, it
was held that the surplus was the
projerty of te optional vendee.
It is true that the option in that
case had been exercised before the
levy and sale, but that circumstance was not of controlling
weight, as the decision was put on
the ground that "in 'equity the
vendee became the owner, subject
to the payment of the price stipulated.
His right of property
therein flows from the coAtract,
and exists before any purchase
money may have been paid:" Cit-.
ing Siter's Appeal, :i6 Pa. 178.
We are of opinion that, upon 'the
exercise of its option to redeem,
the appellee's equitable title reverted back to the date of the original agreement, and appellee became the owner of the owner of
the land as it was at such date, or
of the insurance money which
stoodfpro lanto in its place.
Before discussing the case further
it will be well to summarize the
other decisions to which reference
has been made.
In Rayner v. Preston,. it appeared
that the plaintiffs had purchased
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from the defendants a messuage
and workshops. Between the date
of the contract and the time fixed
for settlement, the buildings purchased were injured by fire. The
vendors had before the contract
insured the buildings against fire,
but there was not in the contract
any mention of this fact or of the
policy. The vendors collected the
policy money from the insurance
office, and the vendees brought an
action to establish their right to
the money thus received or to
have it applied in or towards reinstating the buildings injured.
Against the dissent ofJAMES, L. J.,
it was decided by the Court (affirming the judgment of Sir GEORGE
JzSSEL) that the action was not
maintainable. The following extract from the opinion of Lord
Justice Barr exhibits the grounds
of the decision more clearly than
any statement that the writer could
make:"It seems to me that the question
raised between the plaintiffs and
the defendants calls upon us to
consider,'first of all, the nature of
a policy of fire insurance; and,
secondly, what was the relation
with regard to the policy and to
the property between the plaintiffs
and the defendants in this case.
Now, in my judgment, the subjectmatter of the contract of insurance
is money, and money only. The
subject-matter of insurance is a
different thing from the subjectmatter of the contract of insurance.
The subject-matter of insurance
may be a house or other premises
in a fire policy, or may be a ship or
good6 in a marine policy. These
are the subject-matter of insurance,
but the subject-matter of the contract is money, and money only.
The only result of the policy if an

accident which is within the insurance happens, is a payment of
money. It is true that, under certain circumstances, in a fire policy
there may be an option to spend
the money in re-building the
premises, but that does not alter the
fact that the only liabiliity of the
insurance company isto pay money.
The contract, therefore, is a contract with regard to the payment
of money, and it is a contract
made between two persons and
two persons only, as a contract.
In this case there was a contract
of insurance made between the
defendants and the insurance company. That contract was made by
the defoadants, not on behalf of
any undisclosed principal, not on
behalf of any one interested other
than themselves.
The contract
was made by the defendants solely
and entirely on their own behalf,
and at a time when they had no
relation of any kind with the plaintiffs. It was a personal contract
between the defendants and the
insurance office, to which they
were the sole parties. It is true
that under certain circumstances a
policy of insurance may, in equity,
be assigned so as to give another
person a right to sue upon it; but
in this case the policy of insurance.
as a contract, never was assigned by
the defendants to the plaintiffs. It
would have been assigned by the
defendants to the plaintiffs if it had
been included in the contract of
purchase, but it was not. Any
valuation of the "policy, any consideration of increase .of the price"
of the premises in consequence of
there being a policy, was wholly
omitted. There was nothing given
by the plaintiffs to the defendants
for the contract. The contract,
therefore, neither expressly nor
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impliedly, was assigned to the
plaintiffs, and, so far as regards the
contract of insurance, there never
was any relation of any kind
between the plaintiffs and the
defendants.
But there did exist a relation
between the plaintiffs and the defendants,but with regard to the subject-matter of the insurance, there.
was a contract of purchase and sale
between the plaintiffs and the defendants in respect of the premises
insured. It becomes necessary to
consider accurately, .as it seems
to me, and to state in accurate
terms, what is the relation between
the two people who havecontracted
together with regard to the premises in a contract of sale and purchase. With the greatest deference,
it seems wrong to say that the one
is a trustee for the other. The contract is one which a Court of equity
will enforce by means of a decree
for specific performance. But if
the vendor were a trustee, of the
property for the vendee, it would
seem to me to follow that all the
product, all the value of the property received by the vendor from
the time of the making of the contract ought, under all circumstances,
to belong to the vendee. What is
the relation between them, and
is the result- of the contract?
Whether there shall ever be a conveyance depends on two conditions:
first of all, whether the title is
made out; and, secondly, whether
the money is ready; .and unless
those two things coincide at the
"timewhen the contract ought to be
completed, then the contract never
will be completed, and the property never will be conveyed.
But
suppose, at the time when the contract should be completed, the title
should be made out and the money

is ready, then the conveyance takes
place. Now it has been suggested
that when thattakes place, or when
a Court of equity decrees specific
performance of the contiact, and
the conveyance is made in pursuance of that decree, then by relation back the vendor has been
trustee for the vendee from the
time of the making of the contract.
But, again, with deference, it appears to me that if that were so,
then the vendor would iii all cases
be trustee for the vendee of all the
rents which have accrued, due, and
which have been received by the
vendor between the time of the
making of the contract and the,
time of completion; but it seems
to me that that is not the law.
Therefore, I venture to say that I
doubt whether it is a true description of the relation between the
parties,to say,that from the time of,
the making of the contract, or at
any time, one is ever trustee forthe
other. They are only parties to a
contract of sale and purchase of
which a court of equity will, under
certain circumstances, decree a
specific performance. But even if
the vendor was a tiustee for the
vendee, it does not seem to mA" at
all to follow that anything unider
the contract of insurance would
pass. As I have iaid, the contract
of insurance is a mere personal
contract for the payment of money.
It is not a contract which runs with
the land. If it were, there ought
to be a decree that upon the completion of the purchixse the policy
be handed over. But that is not
the law. The contract of insurance
does not run with the land; it is a
mere personal contract, and unless
it is assigned no suit or action can
be. maintained upon. it except
between the original parties to it."
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Lord Justice BRnTT, having ex-pressed a doubt whether, as between the defendants and the insurance company, the defendants could
keep the money, the company
instituted the suit of Castellain v.
Preston, in respect of the money
which had been paid by the
company to the defendants on
account of the loss by fire. The
vendors having (as before stated)
insisted upon a completion of the
purchase, and having, therefore,
received the full contract price,
which became due and payable,
irrespective of the fact of the happening of the loss, the Court held
that the underlying principle of
indemnity required such an application in favor of the insurer of the
right of subrogation, as to entitle
the company to recover from the
vendors so much of the money received from the vendees, as was
equal to the amount paid by the
company in consequence of the
loss. "The very foundation, in
my opinion," said Lord Justice
BRFWT, "of every rule which has
been applied to insurance law is
this, namely: that the contract of
insurance contained in a marine or
fire policy, is a contract of indemnity, and of indemnity only, and
that this contract means that the
assured, in case of a loss against
which the policy has been made,
shall be fully indemnified, but shall
never be more than fully indemnified. That is the fundamental principle of insurance; and if ever a
proposition is brought forward
which is at variance with it-that
is to say, which either will prevent
the assured from obtaining a full
indemnity, or which will give to
the assured more than a full indemnity-that proposition must certainly be wrong."
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The principle of Castellain v.
Preston is not of as great importance in this country as in England,
because, here, such a case as Raynor v. Preston, would be decided
differently. Here the tendency of
the Courts is to ignore the objections suggested by Lord Justice
BRETT, and to treat the vendor
under articles as trustee for the
vendee. Accordingly, it is said
that an insurance by the vendor is
pirima fade, an insurance of the
whole estate-legal and equitableand that the vendor will take the
policy money as trustee for the
vendee. See Insurance Company
v. Updegraff, 21 Pa. 513; Nelson v.
Insurance Company, 43 N. J. Eq.
256; International Trust Company
v. Bordman, 149 Mass. 161. In
Reed v. Lukens, (44 Pa. 200), under
facts similar to those in Rayner v.
Preston, the Court held that the
vendor must account in equity to
his cestui que trust, for the insurance money received by him.
If, now, we recur to the principal
case, the following considerations
will be seen to be applicable:
I. If the Railway Company with
the option to purchase, had effected
insurance in its own name, and
had subsequently exercised the
option, it could, without doubt,
have recovered upon the policy.
Under the contract, the company
had a valid insurable interest, and
after the loss it would, in collecting the insurance money from the
company, be receiving no more
than the indemnity which the parties had in view when the contract
was made.
2. If Spencer, the lessor, had insured in his own name, and had
collected the money from the
company, and had then, upon the
exercise of the option received the

